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Accountability, Maps and Inter-Generational Equity: Evaluating the Nigerian Oil Spill Monitor. 
 
 
Abstract 
The Oil Spill Monitor (OSM) is an innovative public-sector accounting system intended to improve 
the regulation of oil pollution in the Niger Delta through greater transparency and stakeholder 
engagement. The Nigerian OSM, an online accounting and geographic information system, 
originated from NGOs before becoming part of the regulator’s accountability system. Problems with 
data quality, regulatory enforcement and remediating practices have meant that improved 
accountability and stakeholder engagement were necessary but not sufficient in this case.  
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“if you go to the waterside, the children are taking their bath there; pregnant women are taking 
their bath inside the polluted water. We are drinking it. We are even eating the fish from the same 
polluted water. There is no other means. We are taking benzene. When you talk of benzene in 
water, we are taking 400 [times] above what we are supposed to consume in the UNEP report, and 
we are still drinking it for years. So, we are just like moving corpses.” (Community Leader, Niger 
Delta) 
 
1. Introduction 
Weiss (1992, p.20) observed that “all generations are linked by their ongoing relationship with the 
earth,” and it is difficult to conceive of social justice, within and between generations, in a natural 
environment damaged by anthropocentric pollution. Polluting nature is a violation of human rights 
(Ruggie, 2013) and a breach of the partnership between those who are living and those still to be 
born. The inability of humanity to meet its needs because of the unsustainable practices of 
corporations, public service organisations and governments is considered problematic (Siddiqui and 
Uddin, 2016; Sikka, 2011).  
Grubnic et al., (2015, p.245) argued that sustainable development creates new challenges “for 
governments and providers of public services to address social and environment aspects in policies 
and decision making”, including inter-generational equity. The reflexive relationship between the 
social and natural worlds is reflected in Gray’s observation that “sustainability emerges as planetary, 
morally engaged and as involving human arrangements and their impact on a natural and social 
environment and the resulting (in) justice. It concerns life, death, species, suffering and oppression” 
(Gray, 2010, p.53). Protecting the natural environment is linked to protecting intragenerational and 
intergenerational equity, particularly when damage to the natural environment persists over time 
(Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014).  
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Integrating sustainable development into public sector accountability and governing systems is 
deemed necessary to create social, economic, cultural, political and environmental wellbeing for 
present and future generations (Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016; Ruggie, 2013). Previous studies have 
argued that public service organisations (PSOs) should be accountable for the sustainability of their 
decisions, actions and policies (Guthrie and Farneti, 2008; Larrinaga-Gonzalez and Perez-Chamorro, 
2008). Aligning public service accountability practices with sustainable development is critical for the 
governance of others to achieve an equitable redistribution of costs, risk, harm, resources and 
benefits across generations (Ball and Bebbington, 2008; Russell and Thomson, 2009).  
In this paper, we explore the accountability expected of PSOs assigned the responsibility of 
protecting the natural environment and either, directly or indirectly, of protecting inter-generational 
and intra-generational equity. If PSOs are not held accountable for the social consequences of their 
activities, then this might negatively affect the distribution of social, economic and environmental 
rights, risks and resources between present and future generations (Unerman, 2011). Our central 
theme is whether enhanced accountability will drive changes in organisational practices associated 
with more sustainable ways of living.  
This paper evaluates the Nigerian Oil Spill Monitor (OSM), an innovative public sector accounting-
sustainability system created by a coalition of campaigning NGOs and the Nigerian National Oil Spill 
Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA). Unusually for accounting-sustainability hybrids, the OSM 
is adapted from public participation geographic information system (PPGIS) (e.g. Kitchin and Dodge, 
2007; Sieber, 2006). We explore the OSM’s effectiveness in terms of enhanced accountability, 
stakeholder engagement and improved regulatory practices in preventing, stopping and remediating 
oil spills in the Niger Delta.  
 
Understanding accounting-sustainability hybrids 
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Thomson et al., (2014) argued that accounting-sustainability hybrids practices should make visible 
and thinkable the sustainable governance of economic, ecological and social life. Sustainable 
governance systems are concerned with managing the social, economic and environmental risks 
emerging from unsustainable practices. Accounting possesses a powerful set of practices that can 
play a number of important roles in sustainable governance systems, in particular rendering visible 
and governable the risks of unsustainability (Gouldson and Bebbington, 2007; Power, 2004). 
Accounting can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of those institutions responsible for 
sustainable governance. At an operational level, accounts of actual or potential harm through 
regulatory breaches can trigger corrective actions or policy interventions by PSOs. Managing social, 
economic and environmental sustainability across generations requires accounts to challenge 
institutions to fully discharge their responsibilities by ensuring effective risk management policies 
and stakeholder engagement (Vosselman, 2016). 
Given the importance of PSOs to sustainable governance, we argue that PSOs should integrate 
relevant aspects of sustainable development into their accounting and accountability systems. The 
absence of effective accounting-sustainability systems in PSOs, including environmental regulators, 
might limit the attainment of inter-generational equity (Gray, 2010; Russell and Thomson, 2009). 
Other studies discussed how public-sector accounting practices evolved to meet demands for new 
information through a process of hybridisation (e.g. Kurunmäki et al., 2003; Kurunmäki and Miller, 
2006). Miller et al., (2008) describe hybridisation as when two or more discrete elements combine to 
create a new hybrid object. Hybrid objects emerge in the interface between different organisations 
operating in common networks, particularly in periods where the future of some of these 
organisations is threatened (Beck and Wilms, 2004; Miller et al., 2008; Power, 2004). However, in 
order to hybridise there is a need for a mutual acceptance of commonalities between organisations 
(Thomson et al., 2014).  
Thomson et al., (2014) note that accounting-sustainability hybridisation typically occurred through 
the medium of local, sharable calculative practices. Hybridisation occurred at a local level and was 
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associated with organisational attempts to implement sustainable practices, for example waste 
reduction, reducing carbon emissions, energy accounting. Accounting hybridisation research 
suggests that shared calculative rationalities are a necessary condition for accounting-sustainability 
hybridisation. Accounting-sustainability practices are conceived as hybrids between accounting 
techniques, sustainability programmatic discourses and specific organisational practices (Khan, 2014; 
Kurunmäki et al., 2011). This suggests that elements of sustainable development that have been or 
can be calculatively captured possess the greatest potential for hybridising with accounting.  
However, accounting-sustainability hybridisation is not without its critics. Concerns have been raised 
that accounting can inappropriately capture sustainable development, suppressing fields of visibility, 
knowledge and techniques of governing deemed necessary for sustainable governance (e.g. Cooper, 
1992; O’Dwyer, 2003). Another criticism relates to a disconnection between accounts of an 
organisation and their actions. Parker (2014) notes the importance of accountability through action 
and argues for a closer connection with actions and accounts (see also Roberts, 2009; Vosselman, 
2016). Sustainable accountability through action involves supporting deliberative participation that 
educates, organises and supports environmental protection and intergenerational equity (Brown 
and Dillard, 2015; Gray et al., 2014).  
These criticisms emerged from studies into accounting-sustainability hybrids that were largely 
derived from accounting techniques. However, not all accounting-sustainability hybrids need to be 
derived from accounting (for example, Contrafatto et al., 2015) and there is a gap in the literature in 
relation to accounting-sustainability hybrids that are not dominated by accounting logic and 
techniques.  
We would like to challenge the assumption that shared calculability is the only medium through 
which accounting-sustainability hybridisation can occur. For example, one potential medium could 
be PPGIS (Khan, 2014; Kitchin and Dodge, 2007; Johnson et al., 2006; Sieber, 2006; Peluso, 1995). 
PPGIS comprises techniques that address the absence of information on the social and 
environmental impact of the action of others. PPGIS use a combination of community engagement 
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practises and GIS to facilitate public participation in policy making, problematisation of the actions of 
others, supporting civic society groups, and reforming governance systems. PPGIS also incorporates 
activist practises such as counter mapping or maptivism and is often an integral part of citizen 
science programmes (e.g. Carver et al., 2001; Ball, 2002; Brown et al., 2011).  
From the perspective of accounting hybridisation, there are a number of common attributes 
associated with PPGIS. These include making invisible data visible, connecting high level concepts 
with specific geographic localities, presenting information from different sources, co-production, 
filling critical information gaps, stakeholder inclusion, and visualising complex relationships for 
intragenerational engagement and intergenerational equity (e.g. Sieber, 2006; Eades and Zheng, 
2014; Johnson et al., 2006; Kitchin and Dodge, 2007). PPGIS have also been observed as increasing 
the power of communities to demand greater accountability from institutions whose actions affect 
their ability to live sustainably (e.g. Khan, 2014; Peluso, 1995). Many of these attributes are shared 
with sustainable accounting and sustainable governance (Gray, 2010) offering an alternative 
pathway to accounting hybridisation. 
 
Research Methods and Sources of Evidence 
Our analysis is based on interviews conducted with representatives of NOSDRA, local and 
international advocacy NGOs, the indigenous people (IP), community leaders (CLs) and evidence 
from documents and websites on the subject of the OSM     
TABLE 1: Overview of Interviewees  
Interviewees Role Duration Type of Interview 
NOSDRAr1 Regulator 86 mins & 58 mins In Person / Focus Group 
NOSDRAr2 Regulator 77 mins In Person 
IP9 Community Member 42 mins In Person  
CLs2 Community Leader 75 mins Focus group 
iaNGOr5 Director 41 mins Skype 
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iaNGOr6 Director 35mins Telephone 
laNGOr7 Director 107 mins In Person 
laNGOr11 Director 76mins In Person 
 
All the interviews were recorded after consent to record and publish findings had been agreed and 
the identities of interviewees were anonymised as shown in Table 1. In addition, we accessed the 
OSM website1 to observe the mode of presentation, type of data disclosed, completeness of the 
information disclosed and the quality of evidence presented in the OSM.  
 
Setting the Scene – Oil Pollution and Conflicts in the Niger Delta 
“I have worked on oil spill damage issues all over the world and I have never in my life and in 
my professional career seen an ecological habitat and human communities as damaged by 
oil spills.” (iaNGOr5)  
 “people living in the Niger Delta have experienced oil spills on par with the Exxon Valdez, 
every year, over the last 50 years.” Amnesty International (2009, p.16) 
Despite the oil industry’s economic contribution to the development of Nigeria, the abject poverty, 
ecological damage, conflict, diseases and social inequity in the Niger Delta is well documented (e.g. 
UNEP, 2011; Okonta and Douglas, 2003). Unsustainable activities of oil companies, corruption, third 
party interference and sabotage in conjunction with ineffective regulators have led to Niger Delta 
being ranked as one of the worst petroleum damaged ecosystems in the world (UNEP, 2011). As far 
back as 1990, Shell and the Nigerian government were accused of waging an ecological war and 
practicing genocide on the indigenous communities of Ogoniland in the Niger Delta (Okonta and 
Douglas, 2003). The exposure of indigenous people to polluted land, rivers and air has caused 
enhanced levels of diseases such as typhoid, skin conditions, gastroenteritis and respiratory 
disorders (UNEP, 2011).  
                                                          
1 (https://oilspillmonitor.ng/) 
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NOSDRA was established in 2006 as a PSO with the statutory obligation to protect current and future 
generations of Nigerians by creating, nurturing and sustaining a zero tolerance for oil spills. 
NOSDRA’s Oil Spill Monitor (OSM) was introduced in 2014 and is considered a critical part of 
NOSDRA’s attempt to deal with the catastrophic impact of oil pollution on present and future 
generations in the Niger Delta. In 2011, a report by UNEP estimated that the clean-up of oil pollution 
in Ogoniland alone could take up to 30 years. Unfortunately, evidence from a number of sources 
(Amnesty International, 2015; Social Action, 2014), including the Oil Spill Monitor, suggested that 
this systematic remediation programme is yet to begin in earnest. 
 
Evaluating the potential of Oil Spill Monitor as an accounting-sustainability hybrid  
The OSM was designed to improve the governance and accountability associated with oil pollution. 
There are two notable aspects of the OSM. First, OSM was not derived from accounting or related 
calculative practices. Second, the OSM’s origin lie in activist campaigns against the actions of oil 
corporations and regulators using a range of tactics including PPGIS. Following years of campaigning 
against the oil spill regulatory regime, corporate practices and third-party sabotage; the OSM was 
developed by a coalition of NGOs in partnership with NOSDRA as a solution to the lack of reliable 
information from corporations and NOSDRA (SDN, 2016).  
The OSM was intended to enable government agencies, oil corporations, civil society groups and 
communities’ members to engage and share critical information. There was consensus from our 
interviews that the OSM was the most important accountability reform in the Niger Delta conflict.  
“I think the biggest success is probably the oil spill monitor, where you see collaboration 
between civil societies, the government, and the oil industry looking to create a public 
transparent platform to document every single oil spill that is happening in Nigeria.” 
(iaNGOr6) 
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The OSM provides open access and makes visible oil spill data,2 how oil corporations are fulfilling 
their legal duties, as well as, the impact of third party interference. 
“we have a platform called ‘Oil Spill Monitor’. If you go into it, you will see the report of all of 
those things. You will see the causes and just take a check yourself.” (NOSDRAr2) 
Communities have full access to the OSM and can use it to report oil spills to NOSDRA. Oil spill data 
is uploaded when oil spills are confirmed by NOSDRA. OSM attempts to provide a detailed account 
of the cause, who is responsible, timing, location, quantity of pollutant, remediation activities of all 
oil spills since 2013. The OSM provides real-time information on the management of oil spills 
measured against NOSDRA’s statutory responsibilities. It was perceived to be operationally useful as 
well as useful for external accountability and engagements. As with other PPGIS projects (Sieber, 
2006; Johnson et al., 2006; Peluso, 1995) the OSM facilitated partnership working and community 
engagement.  
“the collaboration we are having right now is that they now involve the agency and the 
agency sees them as partners in progress and then we value their contribution. They also 
volunteer their time and resources to ensure that we drive this message right into the ear 
drums of all those that need to hear them.” (NOSDRAr1)  
The OSM allows citizens, corporations and regulators to co-produce accounts of oil spillage, clean-up 
and remediation and related actions of NOSDRA, other PSOs, corporations and communities. There 
was evidence that the OSM allowed NGOs and communities to audit, verify and challenge the official 
accounts contained on the OSM and monitor NOSDRA’s performance.  
The OSM possessed many of the attributes associated with PPGIS and effective accounting-
sustainability practices (Gray et al., 2014; Bebbington and Larrinaga, 2014; Sieber, 2006). For 
example, it has changed how NOSDRA collaborated with stakeholders and oil corporations. 
                                                          
2 Appendix One outlines the data specification for oil spills. 
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“the whole essence of all these collaborations is to bridge the gap as far as possible between 
the knowledge that is usually released regarding the operations of the oil companies, and 
what the regulators are also doing. So, as far as we are concerned, that collaboration has 
been quite helpful” (NOSDRAr1) 
Our analysis of the OSM suggested that this accounting-sustainability hybrid enhanced transparency 
and greater accountability, with the potential for constructive engagement between the regulator, 
corporations, NGOs and local communities (Sieber, 2006; Peluso, 1995).  
The NGOs and community groups interviewed recognised that the OSM has improved the visibility 
of oil spills and regarded it as having contributed to more effective governance. The OSM has 
enhanced accountability and engagements among key actors, which interviewees agreed was 
essential for improving the governance of oil spills and promoting more sustainable development 
practices in the Niger Delta (see Sieber, 2006; Johnson et al., 2006; Peluso, 1995). The disclosure of 
oil spill data facilitated greater dialogue among regulators, oil corporations, NGOs, communities and 
the general public. The OSM created a platform for local communities to act with others to protect 
their environment and way of life for present and future generations (Bebbington et al., 2007; 
Johnson et al., 2006).  
The OSM as a form of accounting-sustainability practice appeared to be a necessary part of 
NOSDRA’s systems of internal and external accountability and governance. There was evidence to 
support claims that the OSM had the potential to help eradicate inequalities and drive sustainable 
change across generations (Eades and Zheng, 2014; Parker, 2014; Peluso, 1995). However, these 
changes also required ‘accountability through action(s)’ and engagement within and outwith PSOs to 
educate, organise and support sustainable transformation (Parker, 2014; Vosselman, 2016). For 
example, simply knowing inestimable barrels of oil have been spilled, sometimes attributed to 
sabotage and that none of the leaks have been adequately remediated, was regarded as a pyrrhic 
victory (SDN, 2016). The OSM could facilitate accountability through action by allowing NGOs to 
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partner with PSOs and corporations to prevent social and environmental harm associated with oil 
spillage (Tregidga et al., 2015; Sieber, 2006). Concerns were raised that the OSM did not address the 
underlying social and environmental problems associated with historic oil spills, prevent future oil 
spills or ineffective remediation. Accountability practices need to be embedded within robust 
governance systems in order to change policies or practices to protect the environment and human 
rights in the context of sustainable wealth creation and its distribution across generations (e.g. Gray, 
2010; Roberts, 2009; Parker, 2014). 
Effective accountability processes should also be based on reliable, complete and relevant 
information provided by all key stakeholders. There was recognition by NOSDRA and others that the 
OSM data was incomplete and potentially unreliable due to problems with data gathering. Whilst 
there appeared to be potential for the co-production of accounts, power relationships were a major 
obstruction to this potential being achieved. For example, NOSDRA was reliant on oil corporations 
providing logistics, resources and scientific analysis in an operating environment fraught with 
security and logistical difficulties.  
As discussed earlier, improved accountability does not necessarily lead to improved performance. 
Reasons for this lack of improvement in the Niger Delta included conflicts of interest, inadequate 
resourcing of regulators, lack of political will for action and a lack of capacity in local communities to 
enact their legal rights.  The ability and capacity to act, as well as improved accountability, was 
required for PSOs to prevent environmental and human rights violations harm or risk on the present 
and the future generations (Siddiqui and Uddin, 2016; Sikka, 2011). The next section will provide 
evidence that despite OSM’s enhanced transparency, this had not reformed the problematic 
regulatory system, prevented oil spills or effectively remediated the damaged natural environment 
or the lives of the communities.  
 
Accountability, Actions and Improved Governance of Oil Spills 
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In this section, we explore the reasons that prevented the potential benefits of OSM from being 
realised in the Niger Delta. These were inadequate resourcing of NOSDRA, difficulties in gathering 
information, conflicts of interest and lack of capacity in the local communities.  
 
Inadequate Resourcing of NOSDRA 
Oil pollution had affected the lives of the indigenous people and damaged the natural environment 
of the Niger Delta, since the 1950s and was expected to continue.   
“It is a well-known fact that we may not completely eradicate oil spills, even in some 
western countries [where] the level of oil spill is very low, when you compare it with what 
we have here, I think our own is the worst in the whole world.” (NOSDRAr1) 
NGOs have long argued that the Nigerian regulatory system was ineffective in enforcing oil spill 
regulations. Evidence gathered from our study revealed that the regulators lacked the necessary 
funding, equipment and legitimacy (SDN, 2016; Amnesty International, 2009).  
“the agency is poorly funded and this no doubt hampers our operation and performance.” 
(NOSDRAr1) 
NOSDRA were dependent on co-operation and support from the oil corporations to gather 
information and enforce regulations. 
“The tragedy about the federal and state governments that they have not financed this 
regulatory bodies and agencies to do the work they are supposed to do. …He [the regulator] 
has no car or way of transporting himself. It is only if Shell, Chevron, or any other oil 
companies come to him and say ‘there is a spill, we want to take you to see what is 
happening’” (laNGOr1). 
 Disclosing a spill on the OSM did not automatically stop, contain the spill or remediate the 
environment. For example; 
“when there is any spill, they just manage to clamp their equipment and that is all. No 
proper clean-up is done to preserve the environment, to make it productive for the people. 
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So, you discover that from time to time, fewer people go to the farm and when fewer people 
go to the farm, the harvest is not still good.” (IP9) 
The OSM created greater visibility of problems with the regulatory system, but to date this visibility 
had not addressed the inability of NOSDRA to fully implement its standards, enforce its rules and 
visit polluted sites.  
“…every day there is spill… God forbid, if there is any catastrophe in the petroleum sector 
today. Except you go through the normal budgetary procedure, there is no quick money” 
(NOSDRAr2) 
“NOSDRA does not have teeth. …It doesn’t have the enabling laws to bite. For example, if 
they want to go and inspect any oil company, who provides the facilities for them to go? The 
oil company have to lift them… If they need certain equipment to conduct certain tests, they 
need to depend on the oil company to provide those things…They don’t have what it takes 
to ensure that these oil companies operate according to the standards.” (laNGOr11) 
Our analysis of OSM data suggests that whilst there was a fall in reported oil spills, there were still 
798 oil spills reported in 2015 and 152 spills in the first 6 months of 2016.  It was not possible to use 
the OSM to evaluate the scale of the oil spilled due to incomplete and unreliable information, as will 
be developed in the following section. 
 
Incomplete and unreliable information 
If the underlying data is incomplete or unreliable, then any benefits accruing from greater 
accountability are unlikely to arise. There was evidence of incompleteness, corporate capture and 
bias in the data reported through the OSM. For example, our analysis revealed that only 54% of the 
oil spill records disclosed the volume of oil spilled and only 13% disclosed the volume of oil 
recovered. As will be discussed next, the reliability of these partial disclosures is questionable. A key 
part of NOSDRA’s regulatory processes is the joint investigation visit (JIV) by a joint investigative 
team (JIT) after notification of an oil spill. The JIV is critical for the operation of the OSM as it creates 
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the initial account of the oil spill, which is then disclosed on OSM website. The JIT is responsible for 
verifying and quantifying the spill, establishing its location and related risks, cause determination, 
assigning responsibility and liability for stopping the spill, the clean-up, preventing future occurrence 
and ensuring appropriate remediation (SDN, 2016).  
“anywhere there is an oil spill incident, we will constitute what we refer to as joint 
investigative team, what we call the JIT. So, this joint investigation team will respond swiftly 
to anywhere we have oil spill incident and part of what the team actually seeks to determine 
are: - one, to find out the cause of the spill, determine the quantity spilled, and then the area 
of impact. It will also cause the oil operators to commence what we call clean-up activities.” 
(NOSDRAr1) 
All the documentation related to a JIV is uploaded onto the OSM. The OSM website acts as a public 
record of the processes and related outcome of the JIV as well as a valuable source of information 
for the accountability of NOSDRA.  
Establishing the cause of oil spills is a contentious process as this determines responsibility for clean-
up, compensating for any damage and remediating polluted sites. Our investigations revealed 
examples where corporations denied responsibility for spills or significantly underestimated the 
volume of oil and damage caused. For example, Amnesty International’s secret film illustrated the 
control of JIVs by corporations. These practises were also exposed in a UK court case involving Shell 
(Amnesty International, 2014).  
In this case, Shell initially argued that the oil spilled from its Trans-Niger Pipeline in 2008 and 2009 
totalled 1640 and 4000 barrels respectively. However, in court Shell admitted its assessment was 
substantively under-estimated and agreed an out of court compensation of £55m. This case 
supports wider claims of the unreliability of oil corporation’s accounts of oil spills. Our interviews 
revealed that this problem persisted. For instance,   
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“[name of company] will quickly rush in, pay some people and the youths will be carried to 
that scene. They were busy serving them with take away packs. They will load them with big-
big chicken and because of poverty and hunger; once they see food, chicken they will be 
there fighting to eat while [name of company] will take one or two persons and say, “don’t 
you see it this is sabotage.”  The next thing, they will conclude that it is sabotage.” (CLs2) 
 
Concluding Comments  
Our evaluation of the OSM identified a number of positive contributions in terms of enhanced 
accountability, increased transparency and greater levels of stakeholder engagements in a highly-
contested arena. However, we also identified that this accounting-sustainability hybrid was only part 
of the solution to the problems of environmental damage, social injustice and inter-generational 
inequity from oil spills. The OSM has exposed but not addressed structural problems associated with 
Nigerian regulatory systems, which relied heavily on voluntary support from those it seeks to 
regulate. Too much power and control over the underlying data quality was given to those at risk of 
sanction, which reduced the legitimacy of the OSM.  
However, there was evidence of a substantive improvement in the level of inclusion and 
engagement by NGOs, civic society and communities in the governance of oil spills. Public 
participation was still affected by the power dynamics and politics of regulating multinational oil 
corporations in a developing country. The OSM is a substantive improvement on the past, but it did 
not tell the whole story of oil pollution in the Niger Delta and the everyday struggle of indigenous 
people to survive. The OSM allowed stakeholders to ask better informed questions and enabled 
evidence based challenges, but did not lead to the resolution or remediation of oil pollution. 
The hybridisation of the PPGIS and NOSDRA’s accounting and accountability systems appeared to be 
successful, but reflected, rather than reformed problems with the regulatory system (Khan, 2014; 
Thomson et al., 2014). Whether the dramatically improved disclosures and stakeholder 
engagements will lead to future reforms of the social, economic and environmental governance of 
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the oil sector in the Niger Delta remains an open question. However, from our interviews there was 
considerable hope that the OSM would eventually lead to more effective regulation and remediation 
of oil spills. 
One aim of this paper was to explore how the OSM could impact on NOSDRA’s regulatory responses, 
stakeholder engagement and enhanced accountability. We presented evidence as to how the OSM 
could improve the visibility of the risks associated with oil spills and trigger action from NOSDRA and 
oil corporations to reduce the environmental damage and (intra)intergenerational equity. What was 
evident was a substantive improvement in how oil spills were accounted for and the potential for 
constructive engagement among regulators, NGOs, corporations and the communities.  
Another aim of this paper was to evaluate the potential of accounting-sustainability hybridisation 
that does not depend on shared calculative practices, in particular PPGIS related techniques. Our 
evaluation demonstrated that PPGIS had considerable potential to hybridise with accounting, 
accountability and regulatory techniques and assist in sustainable accountability and governance of 
PSOs (Gray et al., 2014; Roberts, 2009). However, how this hybridisation occurs in different contexts 
will impact on its effectiveness. Sieber (2006) identified the importance of respecting local cultural 
values and critical contextual factors when designing an effective PPGIS. This will enable the co-
production of trusted accounts containing trusted and appropriate content that can be used 
effectively by local communities and key stakeholders (see also Brown et al., 2011, Carver et al., 
2001; Contrafatto et al., 2015; Johnson et al., 2006).  
This paper contributes to research into how PSOs’ manage and account for inter-generational equity 
and sustainable development processes and outcomes. We acknowledge the potential of the OSM in 
making visible and closing accountability gaps and improving the quality of stakeholder 
engagements. However, there was limited evidence of corresponding accountability through actions 
that reduced the intergenerational impacts on biodiversity, pollution of land, water and air 
(Bebbington and Larrinaga, 2014; Parker, 2014; Vosselman, 2016). Accounting for sustainability 
through hybridisation with PPGIS-like practices offers an interesting pathway that merits further 
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research and experimentation. In the case of NOSDRA, their OSM appeared to be necessary but not 
sufficient to fulfil their goal of zero oil spills.  
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Appendix 1 Specification of Data Fields for Each Oil Spill in OSM 
   Unique Spill ID Spill Status NOSDRA Verified 
Spill 
Responsible 
Regulators Office 
Company 
Involved 
Incident Number 
& Date 
Incident Report 
Date 
Containment 
Methods Used 
Estimated 
Quantity of Spill 
Quantity of Spill 
Recovered 
Spill Stop Date Type of facility 
involved 
Cause of Spill Initial 
Containment 
Measures 
Site Location 
GIS co-ordinates, 
Local Govt area 
Estimated Spill 
Area 
Spill Area Habitat Description of 
Impact 
State affected 
Forms A. B. C Joint Investigation 
Visit (JIV) date 
JIV Team 
composition 
Clean up date Clean up 
completed 
Clean up methods Post clean up 
inspection date 
Post Impact 
assessment date 
Remediation start 
date 
Remediation type 
Final Sample Date Certificate date Certificate 
Number 
Last up-dated  
 
